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Sorokin Revisited: The Fate of Grand Theory 
or the Possibility of Cultural Sociology
Michikuni Ohno
Introduction
Who reads Sorokin now? Is Sorokin dead? This is the problem discussed in this 
paper. Is Sorokin a lost sociologist or an active sociologist?
I think that under some actual contemporary conditions, Sorokin’s socio-
logical thought has become significant. This paper, in particular, focuses on 
Sorokin’s contributions in the sphere of “Cultural Sociology.” Thus, I would like 
to elucidate the possibility of cultural sociology in Sorokin’s works.
1)
After the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the structure of polar opposi-
tion between the USA and USSR was dissolved. Once emancipated from many 
political and ideological restrictions, multiple nations, cultures and religions 
started to strongly assert themselves. As a result, they have opposed one an-
other. As to culture and religion, its particularity and uniqueness on the one 
hand, and its intolerance and exclusiveness on the other hand, have been re-
vealed. In a word, “Culture” has foregrounded. These are the academic and 
scholarly situations which are called “cultural turn.”
When we attempt to understand and explain societies and groups, markets 
and power, human beings and bodies, gender and discrimination, organization 
and disorganization, disaster and risk, conflict and solidarity, sympathy and 
mistrust etc., we have to appeal to a property, structure, and performance of 
“the cultural.” We can not only resort to the economic, political, social or psy-
chological explanations; we also need the cultural one. Although “Culture” has 
arrived late, it has steadily become a powerful “explanatory factor” on the 
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historical scene of sociology.
Here we will define “culture” provisionally in the following way. “Culture is 
a symbolic pattern which is shared by social members and controls their ac-
tions through being institutionalized in social systems and internalized in per-
sonalities.” This definition, as suggested by “social system,” “institutionalization,” 
“internalization,” is constituted of Parsons’ action theoretic and functionalist 
concept of culture, and as manifested in the word of “symbol,” it is also of Lévi-
Strauss’ semiologic and structuralist concept.
Thus, we may like to emphasize the explanatory power of culture as an in-
dependent variable or explanans when we explain sociocultural phenomena. 
Such a sociology which presupposes a “cultural autonomy” from socioeconomic 
and material structures may be called a “cultural sociology.” “Cultural sociology” 
is distinct from the “sociology of cultures” which regards culture as explanan-
dum, that is, as dependent upon society, economy, polity and psychology etc. 
(Alexander, 2003: 12-14). In the following sections, while discussing the views of 
Émile Durkheim (1858-1917), Talcott Parsons(1902-1979), and in particular, Pitir-
im A. Sorokin (1889-1968) who had advocated this type of cultural sociological 
thoughts, we will look for the possibility of “cultural sociology.”
Durkheim: Forerunner of Cultural Sociology
In Durkheim’s sociology, it is important to inquire into his concepts of “collec-
tive consciousness or collective conscience (conscience collective)” or “collective 
representation (représentation collective).” Collective conscience is defined as 
“the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of the 
same society [which] forms a determinate system with its own life” (Durkheim, 
[1893]1960: 46; trans. by Simpson: 79, Halls: 38-39). As Parsons pointed out, “col-
lective conscience” had, in its original use [in De la division du travail social, 
1893], the ethical or value character (Parsons, [1937]1949: 318). In comparison to 
this, “collective representation” expresses “the way in which the group con-
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ceives itself in its relation to objects which affect it” (Durkheim, 1895: xvii; trans.: 
xlix). Therefore, it has a cognitive or psychological connotation. Whether it is 
normative or cognitive, collective conscience or collective representation, in a 
word, may be called a “culture or perceived culture” (Bohannan, 1960: 78-79, 81-82).
Now, Durkheim writes about collective representation in relation to its 
material basis as follows:
While it is through the collective substratum (substrat collectif) that col-
lective life (vie collective) is connected to the rest of the world, it is not 
absorbed in it. It is at the same time dependent on and distinct from it, 
as is the function of organ. As it is born of the collective substratum the 
forms which it manifests at the time of its origin, and which are conse-
quently fundamental, naturally bear the marks of their origin. For this 
reason the basic matter of the social consciousness is in close relation 
with the number of social elements and the way they are grouped and 
distributed, etc.—that is to say, with the nature of the substratum. But 
once a basic number of representations has been thus created, they 
become…partially autonomous realities (réalités partiellement auto-
nomes) with their own way of life. They have the power to attract and 
repel each other and to form amongst themselves various syntheses, 
which are determined by their natural affinities and not by the condition 
of their matrix. As a consequence, the new representations born of 
these syntheses have the same nature; they are immediately caused by 
other collective representations and not by this or that characteristic of 
the social structure (Durkheim, 1898: 33-34; trans.: 30-31).
This passage reveals that collective representations, namely cultures, can 
be autonomous or independent from a social structure or material basis, and 
they may be able to develop immanently. Such a conception of “cultural au-
tonomy” will culminate in the following passages in Les Formes élémentaires 
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de la vie religieuse, 1912:
Collective representations very frequently attribute to the things to 
which they refer qualities which do not exist under any form or to any 
degree. Out of the commonest object, they can make a most powerful 
sacred being… Social thought (pensée sociale), owing to the imperative 
authority that is in it, has an efficacy that individual thought could never 
have; by the power which it has over our minds, it can make us see 
things in whatever light it pleases; it adds to reality or deducts from it 
according to the circumstances. Thus there is one division of nature 
where the formula of idealism is applicable almost to the letter: this is the 
social kingdom. Here more than anywhere else, the idea creates the real-
ity (l’idée fait la réalité) (Durkheim, [1912]1960: 326; trans. Swain: 259-
260; Karen: 229, emphasis added).
[Of course] in order to express our own ideas even to ourselves, it is 
necessary that we fix them upon material things which symbolize them. 
But here the part of matter is reduced to a minimum. The object serv-
ing as support for the idea is not much in comparison with the ideal 
superstructure (superstructure idéale), beneath which it disappears, and, 
also it counts for nothing in the superstructure (Durkheim, [1912]1960: 
326-327; trans. Swain: 260; Karen: 229-230).
It follows from the above statements that collective representation or social 
thought (cultural or symbolic thinking) has an power which transforms real 
things into ideal beings, and, ideal superstructure (=culture) cannot reduce to 
material objects. Here we can see a clear idea of cultural autonomy in Dur-
kheim’s thought. 
In relation to this point, J.C. Alexander pointed out some time ago. “Only in 
the studies which began in the later 1890s did Durkheim have an explicit the-
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ory of symbolic process firmly in hand. It was at this time that he became 
deeply interested in religion … Durkheim came to believe that theories of 
secular social process have to be modelled upon the workings of the sacred 
world. This turn to religion, he emphasized, was not because of an interest in 
church things. It was because he wanted to give cultural processes more theo-
retical autonomy. In religion he had discovered a model of how symbolic pro-
cesses work in their own terms” (Alexander, 1988:2, emphasis added).
Moreover, recently Alexander and Ph. Smith have said as follows: “The 
tide[of the reading of Durkheim’s development as shifting to the religious-cum-
cultural] began to turn in the 1980s, slowly at first but with gathering speed 
into 1990s. Concepts like ritual, symbolism, representation, morality, and soli-
darity began to appear alongside discussions of discourse, difference, structure, 
and meaning, and the Durkheimian roots of a newly cultural sociology became 
not only increasingly evident but increasingly acknowledged, as one scholar 
after another read with pleasure and astonishment the Elementary Forms, as 
if for the first time” (Smith and Alexander, 2005:13, emphasis added).
Thus we can find “cultural autonomy” and “cultural sociology” in the late 
Durkheim. As it were, Durkheim was a forerunner of cultural sociology. 
Parsons: Theoretical Elaboration
The concept of culture in Parsons is constructed from the perspective of action 
theory. He analytically decomposes concrete action phenomena into three sys-
tems: personalities as organizations of actions of a single actor, social systems 
as organizations of interactions, and cultural systems as organizations of val-
ues, norms and symbols in his works in the 1950s (The Social System, 1951; 
Toward a General Theory of Action, ed. with E.A. Shils, 1951). In this case, 
Parsons thought the three systems are “autonomous” from each other at the 
analytical level, but they are “interpenetrated” at the concrete level. Therefore 
in this stage, the three systems were conceived as equivalent, and, even a 
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cultural system was looked at from “functional significance” for personality 
system or social system as action system. It seems that the cultural system 
had not any “privileged status” in relation to personality or social system, and, 
it ultimately had been reduced to “functioning of action.” In a word, “cultural 
autonomy” was relatively low.
However, as a four-function paradigm and a cybernetic hierarchy of control 
scheme developed since the 1960s, the cultural system(specialized around L 
function of action system) at the highest level of cybernetic order in action 
system, has come to be conceived as controlling or governing the following 
three systems at lower levels—social system (I function), the personality sys-
tem (G function) and the behavioral system (A function) . Parsons said, “In the 
sense, and only that sense, of emphasizing the importance of the cyberneti-
cally highest elements in patterning action systems, I am a cultural determin-
ist, rather than a social determinist” (Parsons, 1966: 113). Thus in the late phase 
of Parsons, “cultural autonomy” came to be relatively high.
As Fox, Lidz and Bershady summarized H. Staubmann’s discussions about 
Parsons, in Parsons’ view culture is a system in its own right, with its own 
integrity and autonomy, but it is also a subsystem of the larger action system. 
In its autonomous functions culture influences, but does not determine, pro-
cesses in the social system, the personality system, and the behavioral system. 
Culture as a subsystem is also influenced but not determined by each of the 
other subsystems (Fox, Lidz and Bershady, 2005: 21).
2)
In his later years, Parsons emphasized the power of control over the social 
system, personality and behavioral organism as lower level subsystems of ac-
tion system by cultural system as the highest level subsystem situated in the 
highest dimension L(Latent-pattern maintenance) of action system. Also, he af-
firmed the centrality of normative culture(evaluative symbol)—value and 
norm—among cultures or cultural subsystems, and, its predominance over cog-
nitive culture and expressive culture. Moreover, “constitutive symbolism” on 
which the other three cultures—normative culture, cognitive culture and ex-
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pressive culture—are grounded, is brought to the fore. A constitutive symbol-
ism or an existential belief is a subsystem situated in the highest dimension L 
of cultural system, and it is a cultural type or religious symbolism which orients 
to the problem of “ultimate concern” (Paul Tillich) and concerns the grounds of 
actor’s meaning-orientations themselves(Parsons, 1966: 28; with Platt, 1973: 313).
Parsons, in the magnum opus he wrote in his later years, Action Theory 
and the Human Condition, 1978, presented a “Paradigm of the Human Condi-
tion” as the most general system (Parsons, 1978: chap.15). This human condi-
tion system situates an action system itself which involves a cultural system, 
as its subsystem. Also, in the highest dimension L of this human condition 
system, “telic system” is located. This telic system is the “transempirical” sym-
bol-meaning system, which can ultimately control the cultural system as L 
subsystem of action system, in particular, the constitutive symbolism as L 
subsystem of cultural system. Moreover, the telic system which concerns Max 
Weber’s “problems of meaning,” differentiates into meanings of “ultimate agen-
cy,” “ultimate fulfillment,” “ultimate order,” and “ultimate ground.” The last 
“ultimate ground” is the meaning system of a conception of what is ultimately 
ultimate and it articulates with cultural system (subsystem) as constitutive 
symbolism.
The above cultural system as system of value, norm and meaning, while being 
grounded on the telic system, is institutionalized and embodied gradually down-
wards from higher-order system to lower-order system on the basis of hierarchical 
levels of “generality” (e.g. ultimate ground→constitutive symbolism→institu-
tionalized societal value→functionally differentiated norms→goal orientations 
of actors). Conversely, a cultural system is generalized and abstracted gradu-
ally upwards according to hierarchical levels of “grounding.”
Thus “the cultural” in a broad sense, that is, “telic system” or “cultural sys-
tem” is institutionalized in concrete social systems, internalized in individual 
personalities and embodied in individual behavioral organisms while descend-
ing downwards hierarchy of system levels through cybernetic controls. The 
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cultural can provide a latent pattern peculiar to each of these systems. In the 
last analysis, in Parsons’ explanatory scheme, it is thought that the most gen-
eral and abstract “cultural factor” functions as giving “order” for particular-
contextual and concrete-empirical sociocultural phenomena, groups and indi-
vidual actions. It follows from the above discussions that Parsons’ concept of 
culture demonstrates “cultural autonomy” provided with explanatory power, 
at the principle level rather than at the empirical level. It is the theoretical 
elaboration of cultural sociology that Parsons performed.
Sorokin: Essence of Cultural Sociology 
What is fundamental to Sorokin’s cultural sociology is the concept of “Culture 
Mentality.” This is the internal aspect, which belongs to the realm of “mind, 
value and meaning.” The internal aspect is expressed or externalized by the 
external aspect of culture (realm of objects, events, processes), but at the same 
time, the former aspect controls the latter aspect. In a word, as to an inte-
grated system of culture the internal aspect, namely culture mentality is para-
mount (Sorokin, [1937-1941]1962: vol. I: 55-56). This concept is discussed in his 
magnum opus, Social and Cultural Dynamics, 4 vols. 1937-1941.
Three Types of Culture Mentality
Culture mentalities or cultures are classified into three types according to 
“major premises” (Sorokin, [1937-1941]1962: vol. I: 66-101). To begin with, two 
profoundly different types can be differentiated; the Ideational type of culture 
mentality and Sensate type. A balanced synthesis of these both types will be 
called Idealistic.
These three types of culture mentality are founded on their own peculiar 
major premises, which concern the following four items: (1) the nature of real-
ity, (2) the nature of the needs and ends to be satisfied, (3) the extent to which 
these needs and ends are to be satisfied, (4) the methods of satisfaction. Ac-
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cording to the major premises in terms of these items, the following types of 
culture mentality or (internal) cultural system can be mentioned.
A: Ideational Culture Mentality
In this culture mentality or cultural system, (1) reality is perceived as nonsen-
sate, and nonmaterial, everlasting Being (Sein); (2) the needs and ends are 
mainly spiritual; (3) the extent of their satisfaction is the largest, and the level, 
highest; (4) the method of their fulfillment or realization is self-imposed minimi-
zation or elimination of most of the physical needs. On the basis of variations 
under (4), two subclasses of the Ideational Mentality can be distinguished. 
A-1: Ascetic Ideationalism
This seeks the consummation of the needs and ends through an excessive 
elimination and minimization of the carnal needs, supplemented by a complete 
detachment from the sensate world and even from oneself, viewing both as 
mere illusion, nonexisting, such as the Hindu and Buddhist etc.
A-2: Active Ideationalism
This seeks the realization of the needs and ends, not only through minimization 
of the carnal needs, but also through the transformation of the sensate world, and 
especially of the sociocultural world, in such a way as to reform it along the lines 
of the spiritual reality and of the ends chosen as main value. The great spiritual 
reformers, like the early Christian Apostles etc., are examples of this mentality.
B: Sensate Culture Mentality
This mentality (1) views reality as only that which is presented to the sense 
organs, it does not seek or believe in any supersensory reality; (2) its needs and 
aims are physical; (3) maximum satisfaction is sought; (4) the method of real-
izing needs is not that of a modification within the human individuals, but of a 
modification or exploitation of the external world. On the basis of item (4), it is 
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possible to distinguish three varieties as follows. 
B-1: Active Sensate Culture Mentality (Active “Epicureans”)
It seeks the consummation of its needs and ends through the most “efficient” 
modification, adjustment, readjustment, reconstruction of the external milieu. 
This method is the transformation of the inorganic, organic and the sociocul-
tural world. The great conquerors and builders of empire are examples of this.
B-2: Passive Sensate Culture Mentality (Passive “Epicureans”) 
This is characterized by the attempt to fulfill physical needs and aims, neither 
through the inner modification of self, nor through efficient reconstruction of 
the external world, but through a parasitic exploitation and utilization of the 
external reality as it is, viewed as the mere means for enjoying sensual plea-
sures. “Carpe diem” (Seize the day) is the motto of this mentality.
B-3: Cynical Sensate Culture Mentality (Cynical “Epicureans”) 
This type, in seeking to achieve the satisfaction of its needs, uses a specific 
technique of donning and doffing Ideational masks which promise the greatest 
returns in physical profit. This is exemplified by all the Tartuffes of the world, 
those who are accustomed to change their psychosocial “colors” and to re-
adjust their values in order to run along with the stream. 
C: Idealistic Culture Mentality 
This type is the only form where the Ideational and Sensate forms are mixed, 
which is logically integrated. It synthesizes the premises of both types into one 
inwardly consistent and harmonious unity. For it reality is multi-sided, with the 
aspects of everlasting Being and ever-changing Becoming of the spiritual and 
material. Its needs and ends are both spiritual and material, with the material, 
however, subordinated to the spiritual. The methods of their realization in-
volve both the modification of self and the transformation of the external sen-
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sate world. In other words, this mentality gives suum cuique (to each his own) 
to the Ideational and the Sensate. Confucianism is an example of this. 
Relations of Three Types of Culture Mentality
What are the relations among the three types of culture mentality described 
above? We can find the following three relations: that is, a relation of historical pe-
riods, a structural relation and a cyclical-dynamic relation in Sorokin’s descriptions.
Historical periods
Periods when three types were developing are as follows.
First cycle: Ideational Culture Mentality or Ideational Culture was dominant in 
early Greece (Homeric Greece) until the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. Then, 
Idealistic Culture flourished in the fourth century (Socrates, Plato and Aristo-
tle). Finally, Sensate Culture (Hellenistic Greece) lasted from the third century 
B.C. to the fourth century A.D. 
Second cycle: Ideational Culture rose to become predominant in the fifth 
century and was supreme until the fourteenth century (Christianity). Then, 
Idealistic Culture prevailed from the thirteenth century to the fifteenth cen-
tury (e.g. Thomas Aquinas). Sensate Culture has been dominant from the six-
teenth century to the present (e.g. Francis Bacon, Descartes).
Thus, as Sorokin said, in the Graeco-Roman and Western Cultures, three-
phase rhythm of Ideational-Idealistic-Sensate has happened at least twice dur-
ing the twenty-five centuries (Sorokin, [1937-1941]1962: vol. IV: 424; Jeffries, 
2002: 109-110).
Structural Relation
As to the structural relation among the three types, I would like to make two 
observations. First, none of these three cultural mentalities or cultural systems 
exists monopolistically without the “coexistence” of the other two systems. 
Though contemporary culture is predominantly Sensate, it coexists with the 
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Ideational as well as Idealistic cultures. The complete integration of culture the-
sis as supported by Malinowski etc. is false (Sorokin, [1937-1941]1962: vol. IV: 141). 
Second, these three cultural systems are much more vast and encompassing 
than the other cultural systems. Therefore, these cultural systems are called the 
“supersystems”, and the other cultural systems are called “systems” or “subsys-
tems.” These systems are the big five cultural systems [Language, Science, Re-
ligion, Fine Arts and Ethics (composed by two subsystems: Law and Morals)] 
and their derivative cultural subsystems (Philosophical, Economic and Political 
Systems etc.). It should be noted that the three supersystems, five big systems 
and a large number of derivative subsystems make up the “multilayered” struc-
ture of culture (Yoshino, 2009: 192-194). In this case, each of the supersystems 
(Ideational, Idealistic and Sensate cultures) “cuts cross” all of the big five sys-
tems and their many derivative subsystems, and unites all the big five systems 
and an enormous number of derivative subsystems into one supersystem—Ide-
ational or Idealistic or Sensate—(Sorokin, [1937-1941]1962: vol. IV: 138-139). 
Cyclical-dynamic relation
What is the dynamic relation among three supersystems? Sorokin presented 
the “super-rhythm” of the Ideational-Idealistic-Sensate phases in the Graeco-
Roman and Western supersystems of culture. By virtue of the principle of 
“immanent change,” each of three supersystems of culture or three culture 
mentalities cannot help changing according to their inherent potentialities.
By the principle of the “limited possibility,” this immanent change of culture 
mentalities cannot occur outside this recurring super-rhythm. In a word, the 
Ideational culture system moves toward Sensate culture with the opposite 
premise, but it reaches the border or “limits” of its potential expansion. Dialec-
tically, the move toward the Sensate extreme produces Ideational counter-
trends which cause discord and disorganization and move the system toward 
a more moderate Idealistic culture. However due to the difficulty of maintain-
ing a balance between conflicting opposites of the Ideational versus Sensate, 
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Idealistic culture is relatively unstable. Finally it moves toward Sensate culture 
(Sorokin, [1937-1941]1962: vol. IV: 737-738; Johnston, 1995: 110; Jeffries, 2002: 111).
From the above discussions it may be said that a culture mentality or cul-
tural system, whether it is structurally “super-transcendent” or dynamically 
“immanent,” presupposes the “autonomy” of the cultural system. Sorokin said, 
“Any inwardly integrated system is autonomous self-regulating, self-directing 
… unity. Its life course is set down in its essentials when the system is born. 
This is one of the specific aspects of the larger principle which may be called 
ʻimmanent self-regulation and self-direction’” (Sorokin, [1937-1941]1962: vol. I: 
51). Here we can find the essence of Sorokin’s Cultural Sociology.
Concluding Remarks 
Durkheim, pointing out a relative autonomy of collective conscience or col-
lective representation from social or material structures, suggested the possibil-
ity of cultural sociology, but he did not intend to develop it. To be sure, Parsons 
theoretically elaborated cultural sociology by making use of action theoretical 
concepts such as the four-function paradigm (AGIL schema) and the hierarchy 
of cybernetic control scheme. However, also he attempted to develop the action 
theory only, but he did not aim at completing the cultural sociology itself.
Only Sorokin attempted to straightforwardly discuss and construct cultural 
sociology with the presupposition of “cultural autonomy.” In particular, he 
stressed “immanent change” or “autonomous self-regulation” of culture mental-
ity or cultural system. Of course, Parsons also perceived the “immanent devel-
opment,” but he merely treated it on the micro level and in the restricted 
sphere, that is, on the level and in the restricted sphere of science’s immanent 
development through reciprocal interaction between theoretical structure and 
observed facts
3)
 (Ohno, 2012: 135-138). 
Moreover, it should be noted that Sorokin not only discussed his cultural 
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sociology from a value- neutral and purely scientific perspective, but also he 
regarded it as criticizing the corruption of contemporary sensate culture from 
the normative point of view, in particular, in terms of “integralism” and “altru-
ism.”
4)
 Sorokin predicted in the final chapter of his magnum opus as follows:
The present status of Western culture and society gives a tragic spec-
trum of the beginning of the disintegration of their Sensate supersys-
tem. Therefore, their nearest future, measured by years and even a few 
decades, will pass under the sign of the dies irae, dies illa [day of wrath, 
day that] of transition to a new Ideational or Idealistic phase (Sorokin, 
[1937-1941]1962: vol. IV: 775). 
It is in the above messages that we can get a glimpse of one of the actual sig-
nifications of Sorokins’ cultural sociology under the world contemporary situations 
characterized by Economic Crisis, Technological Risks and Natural Disasters.
Notes
 1) This article is based, with minor changes, on the paper given at the Interim Confer-
ence, Research Committee on the History of Sociology, International Sociological 
Association (ISA), University College Dublin(UCD), 27-30 June 2012. I should like to 
thank Professor Kiyomitsu Yui, Kobe University for my attendance and presentation 
at this Conference.
 2) Moreover they continue that on the contrary, in their heteronomous functions, cul-
tural elements such as artworks, literature, and knowledge of musical compositions 
or performers are put to the use of political or economic ends, and in this respect 
such elements are not evaluated by cultural standards but by other considerations 
such as their monetary value, or as indicators of taste, status, or class position (Fox, 
Lidz and Bershady, 2005: 21-22).
  And, Staubmann says in the concrete context as follows: As to the autonomous 
function of culture,“Personal and social life unfolds and realizes itself within objecti-
fied cultural forms. This is the fundamental significance of culture within (sub)sys-
tems of action … Neither of these processes[of internalization and institutionalization] 
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is to be understood as a simple input mechanism in the sense of cultural determinism 
blurring the clear distinctions between subsystems…On the contrary, it is a matter 
of the formation of genuinely personal and social structures and processes. In both 
cases, however, this is accomplished by giving primacy to culture in the criterion of 
their forming.” As to the heteronomous function of culture, he criticizes Bourdieu’s 
theoretical frame as the “conception of the over-economized man” which insists that 
“resulting aesthetic judgments are a matter of class distinction” (Staubmann, 2005: 
173-174; 175). In a word Bourdieu has excluded the autonomous function of culture. 
While Parsons could transcend opposition between idealist (cultural) and 
materialist(economic, political) stances by regarding a culture as one of subsystems 
of action and recognizing a cultural autonomy.
 3) Some conflicts or strains between Sorokin and Parsons are well known. The begin-
nings of difficulties between them was Sorokin’s harsh criticism of draft of Parsons’ 
magnum opus, The Structure of Social Action (Johnston, 1995: 97-99). Afterward this 
criticism was expressed officially and explicitly in his Sociological Theories of Today 
(Sorokin, 1966: 403-411). Moreover symbolically and concretely Sorokin’s criticism of 
Parson’s Structure seems to be manifested in the following Sorokin’s action. Sorokin 
writes in the margin of The Structure of Social Action, the first edition published in 
1937 by New York and London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., dedicated to So-
rokin by Parsons, not a few negative words such as “wrong,” “Not at all,” “vague” etc., 
and many question marks. In particular, as to Parsons’ interpretation of Durkheim, 
Sorokin writes in the top margin of p.713 as follows: “This is all Parsonianism but not 
Durkheimism.” (Cf., An inscribed copy of the first edition of The Structure of Social 
Action in the Pitirim A. Sorokin Collection at the University of Saskatchewan Library, 
Saskatoon, Canada which I visited in 2011). To be sure, the oppositions between So-
rokin and Parsons, such as integralism(founded on not one- sided truth but integral 
truth) versus analytical realism, modified holism versus pseudo-nominalism, theoreti-
cal divergence and pluralism versus theoretical convergence, seem to be superficially 
salient(Sorokin, [1937-19411962: vol. IV: 762-763; Parsons, [1937]1949: 730,747-748; Zaf-
irovski, 2001: 239). However, if we can do an in-depth reading into texts of both soci-
ologists, we may see their views converge on the point of cultural system concept. 
Their concepts of culture or cultural system have common connotations in the follow-
ing three points: “immanency,” “value and meaning,” “symbol system” (Ohno, 2012:134-
140).
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 4) The so-called Sorokin’s “prophetic sociology” made him lonely in the world of sociolo-
gists as well as Harvard. It is certain that distinguishing between sociological and scien-
tific statements and prophetic words is important. But I think that we must take stance 
of not Weber who recognized the gulf between ʻIs’ and ʻOught’, empirical propositions 
and value judgements, but Durkheim who attempted to bridge this gulf in the most 
emergent situations with which contemporary world is faced globally (Coser, 1977: 476-
477, 505-508; Johnston, 1995: 124-128; 174-180; Jensen, 2012: 38-47; Ponomareva, 2011).
References
Alexander, Jeffrey C., 1988, “Introduction: Durkheimian sociology and cultural studies 
today,” Alexander, ed., Durkheimian sociology: cultural studies, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1-21.
————, 2003, The Meanings of Social Life: A Cultural Sociology, Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Bohannan, Paul, 1960, “Conscience Collective and Culture,” K.H.Wolff eds., Emile Dur-
kheim, 1858-1917, Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 77-96.
Coser, Lewis A., 1977, Masters of Sociological Thought: Ideas in Historical and Social 
Context, second edition, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Durkheim, Émile, [1893]1960, De la division du travail social, 7e éd., Paris: PUF.(1933 
trans.by George Simpson, The Division of Labor in Society, New York: Macmillan; 
1984 by W.D.Halls, The Division of Labour in Society, London: Macmillan).
————, [1895]1967, Les règles de la méthode sociologique, 16e éd., Paris: PUF.(1964 
trans.by S.A. Solovay, J.H. Mueller, ed. by G.E.G. Catlin, The Rules of Sociological 
Method, Paperback ed., New York: Free Press).
————, 1898, “Représentations individuelles et représentations collectives,” Sociologie 
et philosophie, 1924; nouvelle éd., 3e éd., PUF, 1967, 1-38.(1965 trans. by D.F.Pocock, 
“Individual and collective representations,” Sociology and Philosophy, London: Cohen 
and West, 1-34).
————, [1912]1960, Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse, 4eéd, PUF.([1915]1965 
trans. by Joseph Ward Swain, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, New 
York: Free Press; 1995 by Karen E. Fields, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, 
New York: Free Press).
Fox, Renée C., Victor M. Lidz and Harold J.Bershady, 2005, “Introduction,” Fox, Lidz and 
Bershady eds., After Parsons: A Theory of Social Action for the Twenty-First Cen-
Sorokin Revisited: The Fate of Grand Theory or the Possibility of Cultural Sociology
（ 17 ） 324
tury, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1-27.
Jeffries, Vincent, 2002, “Integralism: The Promising Legacy of Pitirim A. Sorokin,” Mary 
Ann Romano ed., Lost Sociologists Rediscovered, Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen 
Press, 99-135.
Jensen, Henrik, 2012, Weber and Durkheim: A methodological comparison, London and 
New York: Routledge.
Johnston, Barry V., 1995, Pitirim A. Sorokin: an intellectual biography , Lawrence, Kan-
sas: University Press of Kansas.
Ohno, Michikuni, 2012, “Sorokin and Parsons: Around the Concept of ʻCultural System’,” 
Memoirs of Kyoto Tachibana University, 38: 125-143(in Japanese).
Parsons, Talcott, [1937]1949, The Structure of Social Action, 2nd ed., New York: Free Press.
————, 1966, Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives, Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
————, 1978, Action Theory and the Human Condition, New York: Free Press. 
————and Gerald M. Platt, 1973, The American University, Cambridge, Massachu-
setts: Harvard University Press.
Ponomareva, Inna, 2011, “Pitirim A. Sorokin: The interconnection between his life and 
scientific work,” International Sociology, 26(6): 878-904.
Smith, Philip and Jeffrey C. Alexander, 2005, “Introduction: the new Durkheim,” Alexan-
der and Smith eds., The Cambridge Companion to DURKHEIM, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1-37.
Sorokin, Pitirim A., [1937-1941] 1962, Social and Cultural Dynamics, 4 vols., New York: 
Bedminster Press.
————, [1957]1985, Social & Cultural Dynamics, Revised and abridged in one volume 
by the author, With a New introduction by Michel P. Richard, New Brunswick and 
London: Transaction Publishers.
————, 1966, Sociological Theories of Today, New York and London: Harper & Row.
Staubmann, Helmut, 2005, “Culture as a Subsystem of Action: Autonomous and Heter-
onomous Functions,” Renée C. Fox, Victor M. Lidz and Harold J.Bershady eds., After 
Parsons: A Theory of Social Action for the Twenty-First Century, New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation, 169-178.
Yoshino, Koji, 2009, Sociology of Consciousness and Existence: Pitirim Alexandrovich 
Sorokin, Kyoto: Showado (in Japanese).
Zafirovski, Milan, 2001, “Parsons and Sorokin: A Comparison of the Founding of Ameri-
（ 18 ）323
can Sociological Theory Schools,” Journal of Classical Sociology, vol.1(2):227-256.
This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 22530520 [Grant-in-Aid 
for Scientific Research(c)].
